Statement by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security on its study of Canada’s security screening processes

October 7, 2026
Ottawa, ON

Opening statement by Philippe Dufresne
Privacy Commissioner of Canada

(Check against delivery)

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Good afternoon,

Mr. Chair and members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me today to speak to the Committee’s study of Canada’s security screening processes.

Having a valid security clearance is a condition of employment in the Government of Canada. It is also required in other cases, such as the awarding of government contracts. Individuals provide consent for the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information for this purpose and the nature and extent of that collection will vary depending on the level of security clearance required.

My Office, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC), is involved in the security screening program from two perspectives:

• as an employer, in applying requirements to our employees to ensure that they possess the requisite security clearance; and,
• as a regulator, in overseeing federal institutions’ processes as they relate to their employees’ personal information, including by investigating complaints received, as well as in providing advice to the Government of Canada on its policy requirements and on their implementation.

In furtherance of individuals’ privacy rights with respect to the federal government, the Privacy Act imposes restrictions and obligations on federal institutions’ collection, use and disclosure of personal information, and protects the personal information that they hold.

While the Privacy Act outlines certain requirements for institutions, it does not present any overarching barriers to the collection or disclosure of personal information associated with security screening.

Section 4 of the Act allows for the collection of personal information that directly relates to an operating program or activity of a government institution, which may include security screening activities.

Over the years, the OPC has provided input to the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS) on policy instruments, including the federal Directive on Security Screening, which establishes the high-level parameters governing how federal institutions screen employees who hold or are seeking to obtain a security clearance.

My Office has highlighted the importance of evaluating the necessity, proportionality, effectiveness, and minimal intrusiveness of collecting personal information for the purpose of security screening.

The OPC has also underlined that this evaluation will be particularly important in the context of open-source inquiries, polygraph testing, and security clearance maintenance to ensure that the means will yield accurate information, and therefore be effective, and that there is no less privacy-invasive means to achieve the same ends.

In order to ensure consistent protection of personal information, my Office has encouraged the TBS to provide federal institutions with meaningful and detailed guidance around the Directive, including on how organizations should assess and mitigate the risks associated with this screening.

The Act also allows me to initiate an investigation if I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to do so. In January of last year, I commenced an investigation into the use of polygraph by government institutions. I look forward to sharing my findings upon completion of the investigation.

Thank you again and I look forward to your questions.